Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Theology Faculty Research and Publications

Theology, Department of

12-2016

The Role of the Moral Theologian in the Church: A Proposal in
Light of Amoris Laetitia
Conor M. Kelly
Marquette University, conor.kelly@marquette.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/theo_fac
Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Kelly, Conor M., "The Role of the Moral Theologian in the Church: A Proposal in Light of Amoris Laetitia"
(2016). Theology Faculty Research and Publications. 829.
https://epublications.marquette.edu/theo_fac/829

Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Theology Faculty Research and Publications/College of Arts and
Sciences
This paper is NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION.
Access the published version via the link in the citation below.
Theological Studies, Vol. 77, No. 4 (December 2016): 922-948. DOI. This article is © SAGE
Publications and permission has been granted for this version to appear in ePublications@Marquette. SAGE Publications does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without express permission from SAGE
Publications.

The Role of the Moral Theologian in the
Church: A Proposal in Light of Amoris
Laetitia
Conor M. Kelly

Department of Theology, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI

Abstract
Pope Francis’s apostolic exhortation Amoris Laetitia recast pastoral decisions in terms of conscience and
discernment and asked moral theology to do the same. Such a request invites reforms for moral
theology, requiring a shift from the traditional role of the moral theologian as an external judge to a
more personalist role as a counselor for conscience. This change entails prioritizing the process of
discernment ahead of the definition of rules, specifying the place of the ideal in Catholic morality, and
attending to the ethics of ordinary life.
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In the midst of Pope Francis’s highly anticipated post-synodal apostolic exhortation, Amoris Laetitia, the
pope issues a simple request: “The teaching of moral theology should not fail to incorporate these
considerations,” he enjoins.1 Like the Second Vatican Council’s brief mention of “the perfecting of moral
theology” in Optatam Totius,2 this is a succinct statement with profound implications. If taken seriously,
this invitation should occasion a radical reevaluation of the role of the moral theologian in the church.
To that end, this article offers a three-part response to Pope Francis’s recent summons. The first section
discusses the significance of Amoris Laetitia’s account of conscience and discernment in order to
articulate a general vision for moral theology that is consistent with the exhortation. The second section
compares this vision with the historical role of the moral theologian in order to defend the assertion
that Amoris Laetitia demands serious revisions. Finally, the third section assesses the practical
implications of Amoris Laetitia’s general vision in order to design a constructive proposal for the role of
the moral theologian in the church today. The result is a challenging reappraisal that expects moral
theologians to promote a genuine culture of discernment in the church. This proposal is admittedly
demanding, but it is emphatically necessary if Catholic moral theology intends to follow the course Pope
Francis is publicly charting for the church.3

The Resources of Amoris Laetitia for Rethinking Moral Theology
While Amoris Laetitia is directly and primarily about the family and the challenges that families face
while striving to live out their faith commitments in the contemporary world, the exhortation also offers
tremendous resources for the faith lives of all Catholics. Precisely because the document seeks to help
all families, including those in so-called “irregular” situations, navigate the tension between the gospel’s
high ideal for family life and the inevitable imperfections of reality,4 the exhortation points to a process
that can be adapted for the broader question of how Christians are called to live in the already but not
yet. Specifically, Amoris Laetitia emphasizes the primary responsibility of conscience for the moral life,
indicating that the crux of the moral life is discernment in one’s particular context. In the process of
proposing this account of Christian morality, the exhortation significantly develops the Catholic
understanding of conscience and moral discernment. By attending to the document’s discussion of
these two concepts, one can better appreciate the theological development and, in turn, better
appropriate that development for a productive reform of moral theology.
The primacy of conscience is hard to miss in Amoris Laetitia.5 “Though the word ‘conscience’ appears
only 20 times in the Italian version of the exhortation,” notes James Bretzke in a commentary, “what the
pope has given us is what I would call a ‘thick description’ of what following a formed and informed
conscience looks like in the concrete.”6 Although Bretzke connects this assertion to Amoris Laetitia’s
suggestions for a married couple’s decisions about “responsible parenthood,”7 the place where the
primacy of conscience is most apparent is in the exhortation’s consideration of the possibilities for
including divorced and remarried Catholics more fully in the life of the Church. Here, after citing the
traditional teaching that concrete factors can influence subjective culpability for the agent who commits
an objectively illicit act (AL 301), Pope Francis explains, “individual conscience needs to be better
incorporated into the Church’s praxis in certain situations which do not objectively embody our
understanding of marriage” (AL 303). For this reason, Francis proposes an “examination of conscience”

that will help divorced and remarried Catholics determine their subjective culpability for the end of their
initial marriage and their immediate responsibilities to their new partner (AL 300).
This vision for conscience, and the process of its examination, establishes the foundation for the
document’s most widely asserted “development of doctrine,”8 which admits the possibility of
readmission to the Eucharist for divorced and remarried Catholics, albeit on a case-by-case basis.
Consider the hotly debated passage, which simply grants, “it is possible that in an objective situation of
sin—which may not be subjectively culpable, or fully such—a person can be living in God’s grace, can
love and can also grow in the life of grace and charity, while receiving the Church’s help to this end”
(AL 305). The footnote adds, “In certain cases, this can include the help of the sacraments,” and includes
explicit references to confession and the Eucharist.9 Notably, this statement and its oblique,
accompanying footnote have been the subject of much debate,10 but the basic idea seems clear enough:
an individual may have committed an objectively sinful action and yet she or he may not be completely
morally responsible on a subjective level. Whatever one makes of the pope’s pastoral application of this
claim to the question of participation in the sacraments, the premise is consistent with the
understanding of sin in the Catholic moral tradition. In fact, the distinction between mortal and venial
sins admits that sins normally understood as “mortal” by virtue of their objectively sinful nature
properly become venial sins for the individual who commits them without full knowledge and
consent.11 Thus, it is not surprising that Amoris Laetitia turns to the Catechism of the Catholic
Church when listing “mitigating factors and situations” (AL 301) that diminish, and in some cases
remove, subjective culpability for an objectively sinful act (AL 302).
When Pope Francis links this distinction between objective gravity and subjective culpability to the
“individual conscience” and insists on the need for a case-by-case discernment of moral responsibility
(AL 303),12 he is hardly presenting a radical new idea. John Paul II made a similar connection in Veritatis
Splendor when he discussed conscience and noted the possibility that “the evil done as a result of
invincible ignorance or a non-culpable error of judgment may not be imputable to the agent” (VS 63). At
issue, John Paul II explained, was the judgment of conscience, which is the basis of the distinction
between objective sin and subjective moral responsibility. Tellingly, John Paul II was discussing the
question of an erroneous conscience, though, insisting that precisely because the judgment of
conscience is binding, one must follow an erroneous conscience and therefore he or she is not culpable
if the erroneous judgment stemmed from invincible ignorance (VS 62).13 On one level, this seems to be
exactly what Pope Francis is saying when he discusses the incorporation of conscience into the question
of sacramental inclusion for divorced and remarried Catholics. After all, he does cite “ignorance” and
“other psychological or social factors” when listing the mitigating circumstances that diminish subjective
culpability (AL 302).14 Yet he also insists, “more is involved here than mere ignorance of the rule”
(AL 301), and this is where the pope’s aforementioned request that “the teaching of moral theology . . .
incorporate these considerations” takes on new significance (AL 311). If Pope Francis’s discussion of
conscience were simply and exclusively a restatement of the traditional teaching on the effects of an
erroneous conscience on moral culpability, there would be no real reason to call moral theologians to
attention. That request, combined with the exhortation’s other comments on conscience, reveals that
something more is going on, and if moral theology is going to take both of these aspects of Amoris
Laetitia earnestly, a genuine reassessment of the role of the moral theologian is not only necessary but
also obligatory.

Amoris Laetitia’s most consequential comments on conscience appear in two sentences in paragraph
303. The first sentence acknowledges the Catholic tradition’s typical teachings on conscience and
indicates a development beyond that normal understanding. “Yet conscience can do more than
recognize that a given situation does not objectively correspond to the overall demands of the Gospel,”
the first sentence reads. The reference here is to the aspect of conscience that judges an agent’s actions,
either during the process of deliberation that precedes an action or as part of a moral analysis that
occurs after the fact.15 This judgment, in keeping with Thomas Aquinas’s simple definition of conscience
as “knowledge applied to an individual case,”16 determines whether or not an individual’s course of
action aligns with the more general moral norm that would typically govern similar situations. The way
Pope Francis describes the operation in this sentence in Amoris Laetitia sounds specifically like the
operation of a guilty conscience when it recognizes, ex post facto, a disconnect between one’s action
and the proper moral order. This aspect of conscience is well established in the experience of many
Catholics approaching the confessional, where a guilty conscience has historically been the focal point of
the conversation between penitent and priest.17 The notion of conscience as judgment may therefore be
a consistent element of the traditional Catholic teaching, but it is not a sufficient description of the
understanding of conscience presented in Amoris Laetitia. Instead, this traditional notion is only the first
half of the exhortation’s contributions to the theology of conscience, and the second half does most of
the work.
After proposing that “conscience can do more” than judge in the first sentence, Pope Francis adds, “It
can also recognize with sincerity and honesty what for now is the most generous response which can be
given to God, and come to see with a certain moral security that it is what God himself is asking amid
the concrete complexity of one’s limits, while not yet fully the objective ideal” (AL 303). This is not the
straightforward notion of conscience as an act or “event,”18 nor is it the juridical conception of an
impartial application of the law to specific circumstances.19 It is a much more personalist account that
resonates with the dynamic understanding of conscience found in the work of European moralists
during the mid-twentieth century.20 Not coincidentally,21 this description of conscience also sounds like
the famous claim of Gaudium et Spes that conscience is “the most secret core and sanctuary of a man . .
. [where] he is alone with God, Whose voice echoes in his depths.”22 In fact, Pope Francis’s assertion that
conscience can “come to see with a certain moral security that [this] is what God himself is asking amid
the concrete complexity of one’s limits” is not merely consistent with Gaudium et Spes’s definition of
conscience; it presupposes that definition. What Amoris Laetitia describes is only possible if conscience
is indeed the place of encounter with the divine, wherein God speaks directly to the soul and illuminates
the correct path in the midst of conflicting demands and moral obligations. By taking this conciliar idea
seriously, Amoris Laetitia significantly advances the magisterial23 understanding of conscience,
representing another step in an ongoing process of development and reclamation of the tradition that
has been active in the Church since Vatican II.24 This, in turn, has implications for the field of moral
theology, as the exhortation’s application of conscience makes clear.
Of course, the exact nature and application of this revised notion of conscience is not immediately
evident from the sentence that introduces it. Indeed, as with Pope Francis’s comments on the church’s
sacramental practice, the meaning of Amoris Laetitia’s definition of conscience has also been
contested.25 Nevertheless, the text of the exhortation does provide the basis for a clearer understanding
of what it means to claim that conscience can do more than judge. Specifically, the surrounding
paragraphs in Amoris Laetitia connect the sentences on conscience with the larger issue of discernment,

a prominent theme in the document.26 This indicates that the personalist, conciliar understanding of
conscience found in paragraph 303 is a facet of personal moral discernment, and not just an identifier of
rules to apply.27
Discernment, as Amoris Laetitia presents it, requires a careful adjudication of an individual and her or
his situation in all its complexity. “Therefore, while upholding a general rule,” the exhortation notes just
before the discussion of conscience, “it is necessary to recognize that responsibility with respect to
certain actions or decisions is not the same in all cases” (AL 302). This would seem to speak to the
distinction between objective sinfulness and subjective culpability outlined above, but the exhortation
takes this a step further when Pope Francis cites Aquinas’s assertion that general norms “will be found
to fail, according as we descend further into detail” (AL 304).28 On this basis, the pope insists, “It is true
that general rules set forth a good which can never be disregarded or neglected, but in their formulation
they cannot provide absolutely for all particular situations” (AL 304). Thus, the pope encourages a
process of discernment in the case of integrating the divorced and remarried into the life of the church,
suggesting that the Christian life is not defined by simple rules in black and white but incarnated richly in
shades of gray (AL 305). At the heart of these comments lies a reevaluation of the moral life in decidedly
personalist terms: the Christian is not called to a set of rules but, rather, to a relationship with God. The
process of discernment is designed to “find possible ways of responding to God and growing in the midst
of limits” (AL 305), and conscience is an invaluable tool in this task because it is the core where a person
determines what God is calling him or her to do in the concrete (see again AL 303).
As Amoris Laetitia is at pains to point out, this understanding of discernment and of the workings of
conscience does not abrogate the need for moral norms, nor does it devolve into relativism. Instead,
this conception of the moral life as an ongoing relationship with God presumes the clear identification of
an absolute and unchanging ideal. While this is most apparent in the exhortation’s statements on
marriage (AL 307), it is also evident in the broader question of moral discernment. Recall the way Pope
Francis described the functioning of conscience as recognizing “what for now is the most generous
response which can be given to God,” an action that requires acknowledging the distance from “the
objective ideal” (AL 303). Conscience in this function is supposed to be in constant contact with the
ideal, always seeking ways of getting closer to the ideal as the proper end. “This discernment is
dynamic,” the pope explains; “it must remain ever open to new stages of growth and to new decisions
which can enable the ideal to be more fully realized” (AL 303). What Pope Francis describes is an
ongoing process, which makes the moral life sound much like the ideal of marriage “as a dynamic path
to personal fulfillment . . . [and not] a lifelong burden” (AL 37).29
These points about the role of conscience, the nature of discernment, and the place of ideals suggest
not only a deeper understanding of the Christian moral life but also a reconceptualization of the
function of moral theology. In this way, Amoris Laetitia provides the basis for a general vision of what
moral theology might become. Thus, if the main moral task is to discern the demands of God in the
midst of one’s complex web of relationships and responsibilities, then defining the rules is not going to
be enough. Instead of “a cold bureaucratic morality” condemned by Pope Francis (AL 312), the Church
and its moral theologians must find ways “to make room for the consciences of the faithful, who very
often respond as best they can to the Gospel amid their limitations, and are capable of carrying out their
own discernment in complex situations” (AL 37). While this does not preclude clearly and persuasively
presenting the objective ideal—both to critique the actions and ways of living that expressly contradict
the ideal (AL 39, 297) and to reinforce the value of seeking the ideal in the first place (AL 38)30—it still

involves more than that. Hence, this dynamic and personalist account of the moral life envisions a
different relationship to rules in moral theology.
A new relationship to rules in moral theology is certainly in line with broader trends in Pope Francis’s
vision for the church. For instance, in his address to the bishops at the conclusion of the 2015 Synod,
Pope Francis insisted, “the true defenders of doctrine are not those who uphold its letter, but its spirit;
not ideas but people; not formulae but the gratuitousness of God’s love and forgiveness.”31 Taking this
assertion to heart and building on Amoris Laetitia, the point of moral theology must not be a rigid
dogmatism that attempts to answer every possible question with sweeping pronouncements.32 Instead,
moral theology “must leave room for the Lord,” which means accepting uncertainty at times because, as
Pope Francis himself has emphasized, “If a person says that he met God with total certainty and is not
touched by a margin of uncertainty, then this is not good. . . . If one has the answers to all the
questions—that is the proof that God is not with him.”33 Indeed, the possibility of doubt and
uncertainty, of a process of discernment that leads to a conclusion that does not fit in the standard box,
is a logical conclusion of all that Amoris Laetitia outlines for the moral life. If God is understood to be as
mysterious and infinite as the Christian tradition proclaims, and if conscience—the place where this
infinite mystery speaks to the human heart on a personal level—is the true arbiter of moral
discernment, then there must be some space for surprise and for new developments along the way.
To suggest this kind of contingency in moral matters is understandably unnerving. There is a fine line in
this process, such that Pope Francis admitted to the bishops at the 2015 Synod, “what for some is
freedom of conscience is for others simply confusion.”34 Still, Pope Francis clearly has a preference for
freedom of conscience despite the very real possibility of confusion. Consequently, moral theologians
ought to dedicate their resources to addressing this concern. Adopting Amoris Laetitia’s emphasis on
the primacy of conscience and the priority of discernment means, broadly, that moral theologians
should offer the tools to help the church community distinguish genuine moral discernment from its
corruption in self-deception, rationalization, and groupthink. Presuming the reality of uncertainty in the
moral life, moral theologians should strive to help the faithful navigate the possibility of doubt so that
they can still make moral choices with confidence and not just humility.35
At times, moral theology’s efforts to address the question of contingency in the moral life will rightly
require statements of certain kinds of absolute norms, but Amoris Laetitia sets some important
parameters for this task. First, the definition of absolute prohibitions should not be the primary focus of
moral theology. Amoris Laetitia’s emphasis on conscience indicates that the chief locus of moral
reflection is not the general but the particular. This means that the majority of moral decisions are not
going to be made with reference to absolute moral norms; instead, these decisions will take place in an
area where moral absolutes do not directly apply. By definition, moral absolutes do not admit
uncertainty (VS 67), so if moral theologians are committed to the task of improving moral discernment
in the face of uncertainty, as Amoris Laetitia demands, then they ought to direct more attention to
those moral questions that do admit variety and doubt.36 Second, the number of truly absolute norms
should be low. An absolute pronouncement of an exceptionless norm is a serious statement, and one
that should not be taken lightly. Further, the fallibility and limits of human reason suggest that the level
of certainty required to define a universally applicable exceptionless norm will be a rare occurrence.37 As
a result, moral theologians and the church as a whole should regard the pronouncement of absolute
norms more as a last resort than as the default position.38 Finally, the determination of absolute norms
should involve community discernment. This might occur on a variety of levels; for example, the

magisterial condemnation of “direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being,” “direct
abortion,” and “euthanasia” in Evangelium Vitae incorporated agreement and insight from the college
of bishops around the world.39 At the very least, there should be avenues for officially incorporating
communal insights into decisions about absolute norms in order more formally to justify their
universality.40 In this way, determinations of absolute norms would better reflect Pope Francis’s ecclesial
vision, and the general thrust of Amoris Laetitia, by embodying what Christoph Theobald identifies as
the “pastorality of doctrine,” which assumes that God is at work in the lives of the faithful, who can
therefore offer substantive contributions to the Church’s understanding of doctrine.41 If all three of
these parameters are observed, moral theologians will not reject absolute norms, but they will have to
tread carefully when proposing moral rules. This, in turn, should allow moral theology to give a greater
emphasis to the role of discernment in the moral life, just as Amoris Laetitia proposes.
Given this modified relationship between rules and moral theology, one can legitimately say that Amoris
Laetitia’s vision for the moral life demands a reevaluation of the role of the moral theologian in the
church. By shifting the focal point of morality from rules to a personal relationship with God, Amoris
Laetitia places greater weight on individual consciences and adds substantial responsibility to the
process of discernment. In response to this situation, moral theologians should attend to the challenges
of discernment, creating the conditions that would support serious, and communal, deliberation about
the normative ideals defining the Christian moral life and the degree of variety in specificity that might
legitimately be permitted in relation to those ideals. As indicated above, this does not preclude the use
of absolute norms to set certain boundaries, but it does demand greater flexibility and less centralized
control. Hence, moral theologians will need to think less in terms of definitive determinations issued
with a high degree of certainty and more in terms of processes for discernment. Following Amoris
Laetitia, the chief goal of the moral theologian should not be a final decision; instead, it should be
supporting a culture in the Church that empowers the faithful to attend to the voice of God echoing in
their depths on all moral matters. The exact nature of this process and its practical implications will be
developed below, but for the moment it is sufficient to say that Pope Francis’s vision for the moral life
obliges moral theologians to remember that, like the Church as a whole, “we have been called to form
consciences, not replace them” (AL 37).
The novelty of this calling is hard to overstate. Although a mandate to form consciences may seem an
easy invitation for moral theologians to accept, the truth is that the shifts in moral theology envisioned
by Amoris Laetitia are not minor revisions. They are fundamental changes that require a thorough
reexamination of the role of the moral theologian in the Church. Indeed, the shift from rules and
authoritative decisions to conscience and discernment amounts to a wholesale indictment of the
standard operating procedures of moral theology in the Roman Catholic tradition. To appreciate the
extent of these demands, a comparative account of the historical role of the moral theologian in the
Church is necessary. While a full, exhaustive history is beyond the scope of this discussion,42 a more
targeted history will serve the purpose of the argument here, which is to show that the typical role of
the moral theologian in the Catholic Church has been something quite distinct from the role just
articulated. Appreciating this historical contrast is vital, because an authentic response to the invitation
contained in Amoris Laetitia will only be successful if it can overcome the weight of the status quo.

The Historical Role of the Moral Theologian
Historically, the discipline of moral theology has focused on deciding cases, rather than empowering
consciences. As a result, the role of the moral theologian has primarily been to render judgment. To an
extent, this is a logical extension of moral theology’s roots in the practice of auricular confession. As
John Mahoney has persuasively argued, “the Church’s development and practice of the confessing of
sins has been of profound importance in the making, and the interests, of moral theology.”43 Specifically,
the preparation of qualified confessors required a study and explanation of the characteristics of
individual sins, prompting moral theology44 to focus primarily on determining the gravity of different
sins in relation to each other. To this end, moral theologians contributed to the guidelines that priests
would use in administering confession,45 a process that kept moral theology one step removed from the
formation of individual consciences, and thus at odds with the vision Amoris Laetitia presents. At the
same time, this task led to a “preoccupation with sin” that turned the attention of moral theology to
“the darker and insubordinate side of human existence” at the expense of “almost all consideration of
the good in man.”46 While this might have highlighted the situations that deviated from the objective
ideal, it did not do anything to promote the inherent desirability of the ideal itself, just as Amoris
Laetitia laments.
In fairness, not all works of moral theology that served to prepare confessors fell victim to this one-sided
presentation of the moral life. Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, for instance, was also written with an eye
toward the preparation of priests, specifically Dominicans, whose charism regularly put them in the
confessional.47 This Summa, of course, presented moral theology in the key of virtue and vice as much as
in the language of law and sin. Consequently, there is a clear sense of both the positive possibility of the
ideal in the Christian moral life and the insufficiency of those choices and actions that contradict that
ideal in Aquinas’s work, succinctly summed up in the presentation of the first precept of the natural law
as a twofold obligation revealing, “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.”48 Here
one finds a more holistic vision of the moral life as “the journey of the Christian to God who is our
ultimate end.”49 In comparison with the penitential literature, this vision is much more consonant with
the notion of personal growth articulated in Amoris Laetitia. In addition, the discussion of virtues, both
in general and in their particular species, provides the basis for a process of moral discernment that
could promote the workings of conscience as Pope Francis outlined.50 Yet even Aquinas’s work is not
enough to assert that moral theologians have had the kind of role in the Church that Amoris
Laetitia would entail, for two reasons. First, the Summa Theologiae was still written for priests, and it
was thus not intended for general consumption.51 If its positive vision had an impact on the lives of the
faithful, it would have been mediated by the clergy; this was decidedly not the job of the moral
theologian. Second, Aquinas’s approach did not come to define the practice of moral theology in the
Church, so his model is the exception that proves the rule.
After Aquinas, a theological dispute arose about the underpinnings of his moral theology, resulting in
the growth of nominalism as an alternative basis for identifying the demands of the moral life. Instead of
the Thomistic faith in the definition of universally applicable moral norms from a teleological analysis of
human nature, nominalism argued that moral rules derived from God’s free will, and therefore could
not be specified at a general level.52 The growth of nominalism gave rise to casuistry,53 which became
the dominant mode of moral theology by the sixteenth century.54 While a certain brand of moral
theology inspired by the work of Aquinas did survive the wave of nominalism and the birth of casuistry,
primarily among the Dominicans at Salamanca,55 even that “strand” did not place the moral theologian

in the kind of role that Amoris Laetitia demands because the recovery of Aquinas’s moral theology was
primarily focused on the application of law and not on the formation of consciences in light of both law
and virtue.56 Meanwhile, the casuistry that dominated in the aftermath of nominalism did not do much
to bring the role of the moral theologian closer to the one Amoris Laetitia envisions either.
In its earliest form, nominalist-inspired casuistry asked the moral theologian to weigh the unique
circumstances of a particular case in order to render a judgment that applied to that case. Typically,
individuals brought their cases to the moral theologian hoping to elicit an authoritative judgment on a
practical ethical issue, often in connection with the economic pursuits that were novel at the time.57 In
these situations all parties operated under the assumption that the only opinion that mattered was the
calculated determination of the moral theologian, who was expected to operate as an external
authority. Rather than providing resources for the individual to decide moral matters with a well-formed
conscience, the early casuists sought to make the decision themselves.58 The later, “high” casuists
assumed a similar role, typically issuing decisions in a way that did not reveal their method(s) of
deliberation, thereby making it difficult for individuals to adapt a casuist’s approach in order to arrive at
their own moral judgments.59 The value and authority of their judgments was evident in the
contemporaneous development of probabilism, which provided a means of navigating different
decisions from moral theologians on similar cases.60
In a certain way, probabilism offered a form of moral theology that could tolerate the licitness of
departures from the more general norm in particular circumstances, and thus would seem to be in
accord with some of the ideas about the function of conscience articulated in Amoris Laetitia. In reality,
however, the focus of probabilism was on something else entirely, and its operation was, like casuistry
itself, not designed to promote authentic moral discernment. The key question of probabilism, whether
or not the argument for a deviation from the general norm was “probable,” hinged on two factors: its
internal coherence (i.e., logic) and the weight of its author. The latter was highly significant, and for
many probabilists was the main determining factor.61 As a result, probabilism presumed the weight of
external authorities, not conscience. Indeed, the entire idea of probabilism was useless without a set of
judgments to evaluate. Thus, like the system of casuistry it supported, probabilism asked the moral
theologian to make decisions, not to provide resources.
Eventually, the reign of casuistry toppled, in part because of its reliance on external authority more than
strength of argument.62 In the aftermath of casuistry’s demise, moral theology reverted to one of its
original objectives: preparing confessors.63 Without the need to settle practical questions for individual
petitioners, moral theology turned its attention to the theoretical realm of potential sins. This began
with attempts to summarize the decisions of the casuists, which led to the creation of abstract principles
for adjudicating varying degrees of sinfulness.64 The resulting textbooks, the famed moral manuals,
became the main source of moral theology in the Catholic Church, and provided the basis for priestly
formation through the mid-twentieth century.65 While some have argued that the moral manuals
recaptured Aquinas’s vision for moral theology,66 the truth of the matter is that the manuals, unlike
Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, were much more concerned with defining and identifying sins than they
were with specifying a holistic vision for the moral life—let alone a call to personal growth and
conscience formation.67 As James Keenan has explained, rather than embracing the twofold summons of
Aquinas’s moral theology, the moral manuals regularly reduced the moral life to the latter half: avoiding
evil.68 In this sense the manualist tradition is at odds with the Amoris Laetitia’s vision for moral theology,
but even more fundamentally, the basic equation of moral theology with the moral manuals meant that

the role of the moral theologian was far removed from the realm of conscience formation.69 This
became increasingly true in the decades immediately preceding the Second Vatican Council, when the
Vatican increasingly issued definitive statements on moral matters, expecting moral theologians to
reinforce and pass on the judgments. The assumption of the guild was that the laity was not capable of
the complex task of moral discernment, so the Church assigned the moral theologian to do the heavy
lifting for them.70 In other words, rather than forming consciences, the moral theologian was tasked
with replacing them.
While this mode of operation did begin to shift in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council, which
“changed the primary focus of moral theology from the manualistic concern of preparing confessors to
the concern of living out the full Christian life,”71 Catholic moral theology had a lot of inertia to
overcome. Consequently, the role of the moral theologian was not quick to adapt, and if the controversy
over Humanae Vitae (especially in the United States) showed anything, it was that debates in moral
theology still presumed the casuistic and manualistic understanding of the moral theologian as an
external authority to be sought out for the sake of definitive judgment rather than a resource for the
development of a strong, personalist conscience.72 To an extent, this reflects the observation of Linda
Hogan that in “the history of moral theology and especially the history of conscience . . . there were
many contradictions and ambiguities that have never been resolved.”73 Without addressing these issues,
moral theology as a discipline could never completely change. The problem of these ambiguities has
only been reinforced by the persistence of tensions between the more personalist notion of conscience
found in nascent form in Gaudium et Spes and the subsequent application of a more institutionally
determined form of conscience, which presumes that an external authority will definitively settle every
moral question.74 Thus, even though a number of individual moral theologians have worked to develop a
personalist theory of conscience and to articulate the processes involved in embodying that theory in
practice,75 the recognized role of the moral theologian in the Church has not reflected a similar
transformation. Instead, his or her role sounds consistently like the translator of norms rather than the
counselor of conscience.76 Given this history, and this contemporary reality, the shifts in moral theology
demanded by an authentic response to Amoris Laetitia do indeed amount to a radical reevaluation of
the role of the moral theologian.

The Role of the Moral Theologian after Amoris Laetitia: A Constructive
Proposal
While Amoris Laetitia’s treatment of conscience and discernment suggests a much different role for the
moral theologian than she or he has historically occupied in the Church, this observation alone is not
sufficient for effective reform. If the field of moral theology is truly going to respond to Pope Francis’s
summons, some kind of concrete vision will offer the best path forward. This is especially true in light of
the history just articulated, for the changes occasioned by Amoris Laetitia’s vision of the moral life will
have to overcome an existing state of affairs that has successfully preserved its place for centuries.
Fortunately, Pope Francis’s exhortation offers resources for the construction of a more concrete vision
for the field of moral theology, pointing to the idea that the role of the moral theologian is best defined
as working to create a culture of moral discernment in the Church. This vision, in turn, yields a
constructive proposal with three immediate steps to guide the reform of moral theology.

Amoris Laetitia’s main insight into the question of discernment is stated early in the document: “not all
discussions of doctrinal, moral or pastoral issues need to be settled by the interventions of the
magisterium. Unity of teaching and practice is certainly necessary in the Church, but this does not
preclude various ways of interpreting some aspects of that teaching or drawing certain conclusions from
it” (AL 3). Coupled with the discussion of conscience and the process of pastoral discernment (AL 300,
311) this theological modus operandi indicates that the real work of moral discernment will take place in
the particular rather than the universal. This task carries with it a unique set of risks and challenges, and
if this process is to become more common, then addressing the unique concerns that accompany
discernment in particular matters offers the means to thicken the practical implications of Amoris
Laetitia’s general vision for the role of the moral theologian in the Church.
The most pertinent concern when addressing moral matters in their particularity is error. As Pope
Francis states in Amoris Laetitia, citing Aquinas’s distinction between primary and secondary precepts of
the natural law, “The [moral] principle will be found to fail, according as we descend further into detail”
(AL 304).77 For Aquinas, this claim implied two corollary conclusions. First, secondary and subsequent
precepts could admit legitimate variation on the basis of particular circumstances.78 Second, secondary
precepts might be misunderstood or erroneously applied. Thus, when the central moral question is the
discernment of conscience in particular cases, the possibility of error is a very real concern because one
could either make the wrong decision about the legitimacy of variation or mistakenly identify the wrong
norm. Faith in the guidance of the Holy Spirit can help to ameliorate fears of error, especially when
conscience is understood as the voice of God’s very self, but this still does not eliminate the possibility of
error because misinterpretation and self-deception are still possible. Traditionally, the Catholic Church
has relied on the magisterium to provide assurance in moral matters, asserting that the Holy Spirit is
active in the institutional church in a way that protects against error.79 While some have disputed the
application of this claim to all teachings of the magisterium,80 one does not need to affirm any particular
form of dissent to recognize the persistence of the problem of error whenever finite humans attempt to
capture some aspect of the mystery of the divine.81 On the one hand, there is the matter of change in
magisterial teaching over time, which has occasionally led to the practical reversal of the magisterium’s
position on certain moral matters.82 On the other hand, there are also those issues that are left
unaddressed by the magisterium, which would not benefit from the same assurances. For both of these
reasons, the faithful must contend, at a minimum, with the possibility of error in their discernment of
particular moral matters.
In the face of this reality, communal discernment is more important than ever. First, if one adopts a
certain degree of epistemic humility about her or his moral conclusions, then conversations with
others—especially those with whom one might disagree—offer a valuable opportunity to reexamine
one’s moral conclusions, either reconfirming their veracity or inviting their reform.83 Second, the
realities of “standpoint epistemology” assert that a person’s context and experiences influence the
intellectual blind spots she or he brings to a contested question.84 Consequently, a discernment process
that invites multiple perspectives to reflect on the same moral question has a greater likelihood of
avoiding the sorts of errors that are produced by overlooking a pertinent aspect of the situation at
hand.85 In fact, Aquinas himself proposed this sort of solution to the issue of error in “contingent
particular cases,” asserting that these matters “are considered by several with greater clarity, since what
one takes note of, escapes the notice of another.”86 Third, even the virtue of prudence, which is a
classical resource for the determination of right conduct in particular situations,87 is a virtue that must

be “taught by others” if it is going to develop properly.88 Taken together, these factors indicate that
communal discernment is a necessary response to the problem of error in moral judgment,89 and thus
an essential component of the reevaluation of moral theology in light of Amoris Laetitia.
Of course, there is a potential objection that one might raise to this emphasis on communal
discernment. The main elements of Amoris Laetitia linking the exhortation to reforms in moral theology
are the document’s emphasis on conscience and discernment. The judgment of conscience, precisely
because it is a judgment that applies to a concrete particular, is a judgment made for and by an
individual. A person must arrive at an answer to these questions in her or his own conscience and
cannot rely on the decision of someone else’s conscience.90 Thus, the process of communal discernment
may seem to invite other people’s consciences to make the decisions that an individual should make for
himself or herself.91 This objection, however, misstates the nature of conscience’s holistic function in the
moral life. Granted, conscience issues judgments for individuals, but these are not supposed to be
individualistic judgments. Instead, conscience is to be formed in conversation with the community of
faith and its dictates are properly developed with a genuine concern for the social implications of
personal actions.92 Incorporating communal discernment into the conscience’s process of reflection and
judgment therefore ensures that conscience functions responsibly while also combating the risks of
error.93 Indeed, since the possibility of error is greater when dealing with particularities, the more moral
theology embraces the vision of Amoris Laetitia for a conscience-based approach to the moral life, the
more the field will need to encourage communal discernment.
Unfortunately, as the discussion of the history of moral theology has already indicated, communal
discernment is not an area in which moral theology has traditionally excelled. In terms of addressing the
complexities of life, Catholic moral theology has more readily proposed a prophetic approach that
concentrates on “safety” and certainty rather than nuance. The alternative, a pilgrim perspective that
acknowledges the eschatological not yet alongside the prophetic already, has not received enough
attention.94 As a result, Catholic moral theology is still well equipped to offer answers, but not prepared
to support a process of moral discernment. Even when the faithful find themselves interested in
communal discernment and deliberation, they quickly discover that there are too few resources to help
them navigate this challenging task because “the current climate . . . value[s] external conformity over
honest disagreement on moral matters.”95 What the Church needs is a set of resources that will help
individuals adjudicate the ethical decisions they have to face in their pilgrim lives on earth, a sort of
common language that will allow people to explain the processes behind their decisions so that their
moral choices do not have to be made alone, but can instead occur in a spirit of communal discernment.
This is the task that ought to define the role of the moral theologian in the Church.
To put this task in other terms, one might say that, consistent with Amoris Laetitia, the specific role of
the moral theologian is to create a culture of moral discernment in the Church. This is especially apt
when one adopts Ann Swidler’s famous definition of culture “as a ‘tool kit’ of symbols, stories, rituals,
and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of
problems.”96 If the Catholic Church had an authentic culture of moral discernment, then the faithful
would have a tool kit of resources to help them sort through the contingencies and complexities that
make decisions of conscience so intimately particular. Catholics would then be prepared for the type of
nuanced discernment that Amoris Laetitia suggests is at the heart of the Christian moral life. Just as
importantly, that tool kit would be a shared resource, meaning that Catholics would be able to discuss

openly the means of discernment used in a particular decision of conscience, and others would be able
to reflect on that process and contribute to it in a way that might mitigate the potential for error.
This communal setting will be especially important if one takes all the possibilities of Amoris Laetitia’s
discussion of conscience and discernment seriously. Recall that Pope Francis admitted that one could
discern in conscience “with sincerity and honesty what for now is the most generous response which
can be given to God . . . while not yet fully the objective ideal” (AL 303). In such situations, error is
arguably a greater risk not just because particular judgments are at hand but also because the
acceptance of distance from the ideal can be easily colored by self-deception. Fortunately, a culture of
moral discernment that both invites and empowers communal conversations about the process of
responding to God in a way that departs from the ideal is a necessary check against these dangers. In
addition, such a culture also provides a degree of accountability, which is essential because, again,
according to Amoris Laetitia, “this discernment is dynamic; it must remain ever open to new stages of
growth and to new decisions which can enable the ideal to be more fully realized” (AL 303). This
dynamic nature means that the discernment of a response that is “not yet fully the objective ideal,”
while potentially legitimate, is also always contingent. Should circumstances change, one might again be
called, in conscience, to embrace fully the objective ideal. Like the discernment of the licitness of
straying from the ideal in the first place, the determination that one is called to re-embrace the ideal is
also prone to self-deception and inertia. Communal accountability will therefore be a particularly
valuable asset for this whole endeavor.
For all these reasons, the pursuit of a culture of moral discernment is an appropriate way to redefine the
role of the moral theologian in conversation with Amoris Laetitia, but that goal cannot be a mere
abstraction. If moral theology is going to respond to Pope Francis’s invitation effectively and change the
role of the theologian accordingly, the discipline will need to transform in concrete ways. So, by way of
concluding, I will offer three practical reforms that the field of moral theology can adopt in its response
to the moral vision of Amoris Laetitia.
First, moral theologians should give special attention to the process of moral deliberation. This is not to
say that moral theology should prescind from questions about moral norms and avoid the production of
rules, as the general discussion of the role of absolute norms in light of Amoris Laetitia’s vision for moral
theology has already demonstrated. A space for rules, and not just absolutes, is still consistent with
Pope Francis’s stated emphasis on individual consciences, for he has insisted that the need to attend to
consciences in difficult cases “in no way detracts from the importance of formulae—they are
necessary—or from the importance of laws and divine commandments.”97 Thus, the attention to
process does not negate the possibility of also providing answers. Nevertheless, if moral theologians are
faithful to their revised role, they will find ways to articulate the steps used to reach particular
conclusions whenever they offer answers so that others will have additional resources to adapt for their
own situations. There is a certain precedent for this in the traditional “principles” developed in the
aftermath of high casuistry,98 although these principles will need to be presented differently99 so that
they can become more user-friendly. A good way to do this is for moral theologians to show the
application of these principles to contested questions. A fine example is Paul Lauritzen’s exploration of
the question of embryonic stem-cell research, which adapted and applied some of the traditional just
war principles to develop a conditional response.100 One might not agree with his conclusions, but that is
precisely the point. His method of deliberation is clearly articulated, allowing the community to
challenge the process and not just the proposed solution. If moral theologians took this approach more

regularly, a culture of moral discernment might become more of a reality for the whole church
community.
Second, moral theologians should define the role and meaning of the ideal in the Christian moral life. If
morality is to be recast in terms of ideals and growth, as Amoris Laetitia’s discussion of conscience and
discernment implies, then the Church will need a clearer sense of how one is supposed to respond to
the ideal in good conscience. As a general guide, one would imagine a “stance”101 of deference to the
requirements of the ideal and an expectation that any deviation from that ideal would require explicit
justification. Accepting the first practical reform, moral theologians ought to give special attention to the
processes that might lead to this justification. Here, again, the traditional principles of Catholic moral
theology have relevance, especially the just war principles, which are properly employed to limit, rather
than permit, the use of force so that this unfortunate deviation from the true Christian ideal of
nonviolence would only be tolerated under the most restricted circumstances.102 Consistent with a
stance of deference to the ideal, the traditional principles of discernment emphasized the imperfect
nature of the exceptions they tolerated, typically insisting that “evil” was still being
done.103 Contemporary moral theologians can preserve this insight by emphasizing the virtuous role of
regret in the pilgrim life. Specifically, they can balance the possibility of discerning a legitimate course of
action that falls short of the ideal (as Amoris Laetitia permits) with an expectation that the individual will
regret the circumstances that make it necessary to departure from the ideal.104 At the same time, moral
theologians should also encourage individuals in these situations to strive to change the circumstances
that necessitated an exception in the first place so that the ideal can once again be realized.105 With this
stance and its practical application, moral theologians will be able to incorporate Amoris Laetitia’s
emphasis on the primacy of conscience in a way that preserves the function and value of the ideal as a
genuine guide in the moral life. Furthermore, moral theologians will play an active role in underscoring
the dynamic nature of moral discernment.
Third, moral theologians should also embrace their revised role by attending to ethical questions that
arise in people’s ordinary lives. To a certain extent, the rising prominence of virtue in Catholic moral
theology has already occasioned this kind of shift with its insistence that virtue is a question in every
part of one’s life,106 but the idea is that all areas of moral theology need to make some space for the
consideration of quotidian issues. The importance of this attention to everyday concerns is a direct
corollary of the commitment to a culture of moral discernment because the process of discerning is a
practice, and like all practices, it is strengthened and refined with repeated application.107 Thus, moral
theologians should encourage individuals to examine the ethical significance of their everyday decisions
so that they will cultivate the practice of moral discernment, thereby preparing themselves for the more
challenging task of communal discernment. Some moral theologians are already doing this well,108 but it
is still a bit of a niche in the field. If moral theologians have a special role to promote and strengthen a
culture of moral discernment, a concern for the ordinary will have to become a greater part of the
standard work of the discipline.
Certainly, there are other reforms moral theologians can pursue in an effort to embrace the changes to
the discipline that Amoris Laetitia’s respect for conscience and emphasis on discernment would entail. A
greater attention to process, a new approach to ideals, and a greater focus on ordinary issues are
obviously not sufficient conditions for a complete overhaul of moral theology, but given the historical
role of the moral theologian, they are definitely necessary. Without these three changes, there is little
hope of removing the vestiges of a system that expected the moral theologian to provide definitive

judgments on behalf of other people. Yet Amoris Laetitia presumes a very different vision of the moral
life and, concomitantly, calls for a very different form of moral theology. In order to take this vision and
this call seriously, the role of the moral theologian must change, and it ought to change in pursuit of a
culture of moral discernment. By embracing this goal, moral theologians will go a long way toward
forming consciences instead of replacing them. These changes will not be easy, and a true culture of
moral discernment will not emerge overnight, but immediate results are not the sole marker of success.
The proposed shifts in the role of the moral theologian are not merely a means to respond to Amoris
Laetitia, the impact of which is still unfolding. The revised role represents a much bigger project that
seeks adequately to honor the dignity of conscience, which, as the voice of God echoing in the depths of
the human heart, deserves the high esteem that a culture of moral discernment affords. That is a lofty
ideal that can, and probably should, tolerate a lengthy process of reform.
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